Regulation of cryptocurrency

The regulation of cryptocurrency constitutes regulatory, legal and political actions taken by various governments to regulate and oversee the development and adoption of bitcoin, cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies. Restrictions on cryptocurrency have been motivated by concerns regarding financial stability, consumer protection, national security, and enforcing laws against money laundering and other illegal activity. These actions have drawn criticism from privacy advocates, finance companies, and open source code developers.

Background

Following the rise of cryptocurrencies in the 2010s and 2020s, governments responded with increased regulatory attention alleging concerns regarding consumer protection, fraud, and illegal activity. In 2022, the major centralized crypto exchange FTX collapsed, which increased the calls for regulation by governments, particularly in the United States.[1]

Critics of cryptocurrency regulation broadly argue that cryptocurrencies empower individuals and challenge traditional financial systems so regulations must balance targeting fraud and other illicit activity with concerns for individual liberties and innovation.[2]

History

United States

Early regulations, 2013–2017

In 2013, the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) classified certain cryptocurrency businesses and projects as money transmitters.[3] This subjected the businesses to anti-money laundering (AML) regulations.[3] In 2017, the SEC began declaring some initial coin offerings (ICOs) as unregistered securities and taking enforcement action against them.[4] Regulators and some policymakers cite concerns about the use of cryptocurrencies in fraud and illegal activity.[5] Some commentators stated these regulations failed to balance innovation with regulatory control and led to a chilling of the industry.[6][7][8]

SEC rationale for oversight over the crypto industry

Under Gary Gensler, the SEC argued that much of the crypto market already fit within existing securities-law categories and therefore should register or otherwise come into compliance. Gensler repeatedly described the sector as a regulatory "Wild West" and said investors would benefit if crypto trading platforms and intermediaries were subject to protections already applied in securities markets.[9][10]

Disclosure and registration. One of the SEC's main arguments was that crypto offerings that raise money from the public should not escape the disclosure rules that apply in securities markets. SEC staff guidance on digital assets stated that whether a crypto-asset arrangement falls within the securities laws depends in part on what rights the asset conveys and how it is offered and sold.[11] Supporters of the SEC's approach argued that registration and disclosure reduce information asymmetry between promoters and outside investors, a view consistent with foundational microeconomic work on adverse selection and costly information in capital markets, as well as later research linking disclosure to liquidity and the cost of capital.[12][13][14][15] Nobel Prize-winning economists George Akerlof, in work on markets with unequal information, and Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz, in work on how costly and unevenly shared information affects prices, argued that when sellers or promoters know more than outside buyers, markets can misprice assets or even break down, making credible disclosure valuable in helping prices reflect available information.[16][17] Later research by finance economists Douglas Diamond and Robert Verrecchia, summarized more broadly by accounting scholars Christian Leuz and Peter Wysocki, argued that greater disclosure can improve liquidity and lower the cost of capital by reducing uncertainty and narrowing information gaps between issuers and investors.[18][19]Specifically testing these economic theory arguments in capital markets, empirical studies of mandatory disclosure rules, including work on the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments and SEC reporting requirements for over-the-counter issuers, found evidence that investors valued mandatory disclosure even though compliance costs were real.[20][21][22]

Economic substance over labels. A related SEC argument was that the legal analysis should turn on economic reality rather than technological labels. SEC staff said that a digital asset may be offered and sold as part of an investment contract depending on the totality of the facts and circumstances, while international securities regulators later adopted the broader principle of "same activity, same risk, same regulatory outcome" for crypto markets.[11][23][24] Supporters of the SEC's position argued that lighter treatment for economically similar capital-raising activity would encourage regulatory arbitrage. Economists Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, along with legal scholar Howell Jackson and economist Mark Roe, argued in work on securities laws and their enforcement that investor protection is weakened when similar capital-raising activity is not subject to similar rules and enforcement.[25][26] In related research on modern finance, economists Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski, and Amit Seru argued that when regulation is lighter in one channel than in another, financial activity tends to migrate into the less regulated channel, a pattern often described as regulatory arbitrage.[27]These concerns rooted in economic theory were consistent with findings from broader empirical research on securities-law enforcement and the movement of financial activity into less regulated channels.[28][29][30] Economists Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer studied securities laws across 49 countries and found that stock markets were stronger where the law required better disclosure and made it easier for investors to use private enforcement, suggesting that markets work better when similar capital-raising activity is subject to similar investor-protection rules.[31] Howell Jackson and Mark Roe later found that public enforcement also mattered when securities regulators had more staff and larger budgets, implying that rules on paper are not enough if regulators lack the resources to enforce them.[32] In a different financial market, Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski, and Amit Seru studied U.S. mortgage lending from 2007 to 2015 and found that a large share of lending moved from banks into less regulated shadow banks; their model suggested that differences in regulation explained roughly 60 percent of that shift, with technology explaining about 30 percent.[33] The broader punchline was that when one channel is regulated more lightly than another, financial activity tends to migrate into the lighter-touch channel rather than disappear, which is the basic concern behind regulatory arbitrage.[33][31][32]

Fraud, trust, and market integrity. Supporters of the SEC's approach also tied anti-fraud enforcement to market integrity rather than paternalism. In that view, fraud raises the expected cost of participating in the market, weakens trust, and can raise financing costs for legitimate firms.

Economist Gary Becker's work on deterrence argued that anti-fraud enforcement changes behavior by raising the expected cost of cheating, while later research by accounting scholars Stefan Schantl and Alfred Wagenhofer argued that enforcement helps markets work better when investors know that disclosure rules are backed by real penalties rather than empty promises.[34][35] Economists Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales likewise argued that trust is central to stock-market participation, which supports the view that fraud can damage markets not just by hurting direct victims but by making investors less willing to participate and legitimate firms more costly to finance.[36]That logic is consistent with economic work on deterrence and with empirical research linking trust to participation in securities markets.[37][38] Empirical research also supported this view. Economists Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales found that households were less likely to participate in stock markets when they believed markets were unfair or that investors could be cheated, suggesting that fraud and weak enforcement can reduce participation by people who were not directly victimized.[39] In related work on financial misconduct, economists Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru found that misconduct among U.S. financial advisers was common, often repeated, and concentrated in certain firms, reinforcing the view that anti-fraud enforcement helps protect market trust and prevent bad actors from raising the cost of participation for everyone else.[40]

Platform conflicts and vertical integration. In the cases against major crypto trading platforms, the SEC also emphasized conflicts of interest created when a single firm combined exchange, brokerage, custody, lending, clearing, or affiliated trading functions. In 2022, Gensler said crypto intermediaries should register each of their functions and might need to separate them into distinct legal entities to reduce conflicts of interest and improve investor protection.[41][42] Similar concerns later appeared in international regulatory work, including IOSCO recommendations and a Financial Stability Board report on multifunction crypto-asset intermediaries, both of which highlighted conflicts of interest, client-asset protection, market manipulation, and contagion risks from vertically integrated business models.[23][43][44]

Finance theory by Lawrence Glosten and Paul Milgrom, and separately by Albert Kyle, argued that when some traders or intermediaries have better information than others, markets become less fair and trading costs rise, which helps explain why market structure and conflicts of interest matter for investor protection.[45][46] More broadly, Hamid Mehran and René Stulz argued that when a single financial firm combines several functions, it can create incentives to steer customers, misuse information, or shift risks in ways that harm clients and weaken market integrity.[47] Empirical research supported those concerns. Douglas Cumming, Sofia Johan, and Dan Li studied 42 stock exchanges around the world and found that exchanges with more detailed rules against market manipulation, insider trading, and broker conflicts tended to have better liquidity, suggesting that stronger rules around trading conduct and conflicted intermediation can improve market quality.[48] In another market, Mark Egan, Shan Ge, and Johnny Tang found that variable annuity sales were far more sensitive to brokers' commissions than to investors' interests, and that after a proposed fiduciary rule the sales of high-expense annuities fell sharply, supporting the view that limiting conflicts of interest can lead to better outcomes for customers.[49]

SEC enforcement actions against major crypto industry participants

Under Gary Gensler, the SEC brought more than 120 actions against cryptocurrency companies and projects.[50][51] Gensler described the market as a regulatory "Wild West," arguing that large parts of the industry had developed outside the investor-protection and registration rules that apply in securities markets.[52][53] The SEC argued that applying existing securities laws to crypto offerings and intermediaries was necessary to protect investors and bring similar capital-raising and trading activity under similar rules.

In 2020, the SEC sued Ripple, alleging that sales of its token constituted unregistered securities offerings. Ripple chief executive Brad Garlinghouse criticized the SEC for lacking regulatory clarity, arguing that the agency's approach had hindered blockchain innovation and unfairly targeted projects that did not qualify as securities.[54][50][55] In 2024, Ripple won a partial legal victory when a court ruled that some retail XRP sales were not securities transactions.[56]

In 2021, the SEC charged LBRY, a blockchain-based video platform, with selling unregistered digital securities in the form of its LBRY Credits (LBC). The case was litigated in federal court.[57] Like Ripple, LBRY argued that the SEC had failed to provide sufficient regulatory clarity, stating that "Even after five years of fighting and a court ruling, we still honestly do not know how to legally launch a public blockchain in the U.S."[58] LBRY founder Jeremy Kauffman said the SEC was seeking to damage the cryptocurrency industry.[59] In 2022, a federal court ruled for the SEC, holding that the LBC tokens had been offered and sold as securities and therefore had to be registered.[58] In 2023, LBRY shut down, citing SEC penalties, legal costs, and private debts.[60]

In 2023, the SEC also brought actions against major cryptocurrency exchanges including Binance and Coinbase, alleging that they were operating unregistered securities platforms.[2] The SEC's complaint against Binance also alleged that the company had illegally served U.S. users and commingled customer funds.[61] The Binance charges were dropped in 2025, in what MacKenzie Sigalos of CNBC described as "a symbolic end to one of the most aggressive crypto crackdowns in U.S. history."[61]

DOJ criminal prosecutions of privacy tools

In 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice charged Roman Storm, the developer of the Ethereum-based mixing service Tornado Cash, with conspiracy to commit money laundering.[62] In 2024, the DOJ arrested Keonne Rodriguez and William Lonergan Hill, developers of Samourai Wallet, a privacy-focused bitcoin wallet that uses a Coinjoin tool that mixes a bitcoin transaction with other transactions, also alleging money laundering.[63] Critics of the prosecutions described them as attacks on open source application development and financial privacy and made parallels to other historical examples of prosecution of privacy tools such as encryption software.[64][65] Organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, argue that these prosecutions constitute an unconstitutional attack on freedom of speech, arguing that the writing and development of code is protected by the First Amendment.[66]

Legislation and political campaigns

Senator Elizabeth Warren has been a persistent advocate for increasing regulations on cryptocurrencies, going so far as to create what she called an "anti-crypto army."[67] Warren supported legislation to expand anti-money laundering compliance and increase federal surveillance on crypto.[68] Some have described Warren's actions as attacks on user privacy, individual custody of money, and the ability to securely hold inflation hedges[69] and that these attacks are a political miscalculation.[70]

John Deaton, one of Warren's competitors in her 2024 Senate race, cited Warren’s support for regulation of cryptocurrencies as a primary motivation to run against her.[71] Deaton stated "She's always been going to lose the war [on crypto] because I think I'm gonna beat her."[69] Some US Democrats are supportive of cryptocurrency and have been critical of proposals to regulate it.[72][73][74] Corey Booker has discussed how he believes crypto is a “democratizing" force and helps people who have been shut out from traditional banking receive increased financial access.[75]

In 2023, while running for president, Ron DeSantis claimed that the Biden Administration had declared a "war on bitcoin and cryptocurrency" that he claimed he would end if elected president.[76]

Shift in U.S. policy

In the 2024 presidential election, crypto regulation became a wedge issue. Donald Trump, originally a critic of cryptocurrency and bitcoin, saying bitcoin was "based on thin air,"[77] reversed his stance in the election, stating he would end what he called "Kamala's,"[78] "Biden's,"[79] and the "federal bureaucracy's"[80] regulation of cryptocurrencies."[81] He also stated he would fire Gary Gensler. Observers noted that Trump's reversal was similar to other populist pivots he has done previously.[81]

As a result, individuals in the crypto industry began to support Trump's campaign. The Winklevoss twins donated millions,[82] venture capitalist David Sacks hosted a fundraiser for his campaign,[83] and a crypto-focused PAC called Fairshake was created to oppose anti-crypto politicians and support pro-crypto politicians.[54][79] Following Trump's electoral victory, Gary Gensler announced that he would step down on January 20, 2025.[52] As part of Trump's inauguration, he held a Crypto Ball where David Sacks declared that, "The war on crypto is over."[56][84]

In 2025, after returning to office, Trump advanced a series of pro-crypto measures. He signed an executive order ordering the creation of a strategic bitcoin reserve.[85] He also hosted a White House crypto summit with industry leaders present to discuss regulatory reform and technological innovation.[86][87] In February 2025, the SEC dropped its lawsuit against Coinbase and halted investigations into Gemini, OpenSea and Uniswap Labs. Following these changes, Cameron Winklevoss stated that, “This marks another milestone to the end of the war on crypto.”[88] Other observers said that these actions symbolized a political pivot and a de-escalation in the "war on crypto".[89][50][90] The Trump administration has not ceased all enforcement actions against cryptocurrency projects. The prosecution of Tornado Cash founder Roman Storm continues to be ongoing with chief legal officer of the crypto firm Variant stating, "This really is a vestige of the Biden administration’s war on crypto", and that, "It’s shocking the case is still moving forward.”[62]

In 2025, the House Committee on Financial Services and Senate Banking Committee started investigations into "Operation Chokepoint 2.0", an alleged conspiracy that claims the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and other regulators coordinated to pressure banks to stop business with all crypto-related activity.[91]

China

In 2017, China banned cryptocurrency exchanges with concerns of "capital outflows" and "financial instability."[92] In 2021, China's Inner Mongolia region announced a local "war on cryptocurrency mining", to meet energy targets.[93][94] Shortly thereafter, national authorities banned crypto mining nationwide.[95] Analysts state that cryptocurrencies are seen as a threat to the use of the digital-yuan.[95]

Europe

In the European Union, management of the crtyptocurrency market has mainly focused on safeguarding user privacy and fighting moneylaundering rather than outright bans on sales. In 2018, the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5) in Europe began the process of regulating cryptocurrency exchanges and self-custodial wallets.[96] In 2021, the European Commission sought to create a surveillance system that would collect and share data on millions of crypto users, with the stated motivation of "beating financial crime."[97] In 2022, European policymakers have advanced measures that some critics argue threaten financial privacy. One of these proposed EU rules targets self-custodial bitcoin wallets, which some have claimed would limit an individual's ability to hold crypto outside of centralized exchanges.[98] In response, civic initiatives such as the Digital Freedom Declaration have called on the EU to establish clearer legal protections for privacy-enhancing technologies, arguing that privacy is a human right that should be applicable to digital and financial activity.[99] In 2024, a panel of judges in the Netherlands convicted Alexey Pertsev, one of the developers of Tornado Cash, with money laundering for developing the code for the open source project.[6] In 2025, the Financial Action Task Force Travel Rule, began to require verifying wallet ownership and collect personal data.[100] Additionally, financial institutions, including cryptocurrency exchanges must collect know your customer information and share it with other institutions involved in the transaction. Critics say that these regulations could push users toward centralized custodians, exposing them to risks such as hacking, data breaches, and government surveillance of transactions.[100]

See also

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