Emigration of Christians from Israel and Palestine

Palestinian Christian communities are emigrating from both Palestine and Israel, particularly from cities such as Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Nazareth, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour. Scholars characterize this emigration as a structurally driven phenomenon linked to political conflict, economic pressures, and migration networks, rather than religious persecution.

Prior to the Nakba, 135,550 Christians lived in Mandatory Palestine, of which 110,200 (81%) lived in areas that are today Israel and East Jerusalem, and 25,350 (19%) in what is now the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[1] The most recent censuses show 180,300 Christians in Israel (including East Jerusalem), of which c.141,900 (79%) are Arab Christians (Palestinian Christians),[2] and 46,850 Christians in the Palestinian territories.[3]

The phenomenon is part of the wider trend of Palestinian emigration, which has been higher among Christians due to historical circumstances,[4] and part of a wider trend among Arab Christians.[5]

Causes

Economic factors

Christian emigration is often undertaken in pursuit of better living standards, and primarily driven by economic considerations.[6][7] The Jerusalem Post stated in 2009 that the "shrinking of the Palestinian Christian community in the Holy Land came as a direct result of its middle-class standards".[8] A survey carried out in 1993 showed that "the poor economic situation is cited as a cause for emigration by the overwhelming majority of those intending to leave, with the political conditions given as a second reason."[9] A 2020 survey showed a similar result: "The largest percentage indicate that their desire to emigrate stems from economic reasons".[10]

In a 2020 study, similar factors were noted with respect to emigration of Christian communities in Gaza.[11]

Chain migration

Chain migration is a significant factor particularly from areas such as Bethlehem and adjacent towns which produced some of the largest Palestinian Christian communities outside the Middle East. Scholars note that remittances and return visits have mitigated—but not reversed—the long-term population decline of Christian communities in Palestine.[12][13]

Transnational family networks have shaped emigration among Palestinian Christians, providing knowledge of and access to opportunities abroad. Long-standing migration to the Americas created dense networks and family business structures that provided economic support and reduced the risks associated with relocation. These networks influenced migrants’ destinations and facilitated the establishment of new diaspora hubs. In addition, the emigration of entire family groups weakened ties to local communities, contributing to further pressure for outward migration.[14]

Birth rates

The Christian share of overall population has also decreased due to low birth rates compared to both Jewish and Muslim communities.[15][7] In Israel in 2024, Jewish and Muslim women had a fertility rate of 3.10 and 2.68 children respectively, significantly higher that the 1.62 fertility rate amongst Christian women.[16]

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and intercommunal relations

The Vatican and the Catholic Church blamed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the Christian exodus from the Holy Land and the Middle East in general.[17]

In a 2006 poll of Christians in Bethlehem by the Palestinian Centre for Research and Cultural Dialogue, 90% reported having Muslim friends, 73% agreed that the Palestinian Authority treats Christian heritage in the city with respect, and 78% attributed the ongoing exodus of Christians from Bethlehem to the Israeli West Bank barrier causing an economic crisis in Bethlehem.[18] Daniel Rossing, the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs' chief liaison to Christians in the 1970s and 1980s, has stated that the situation for them in Gaza became much worse after the election of Hamas. He also stated that the Palestinian Authority, which counts on Christian westerners for financial support, treats the minority fairly.[8]

The United States State Department's 2006 report on religious freedom criticized both Israel for its restrictions on travel to Christian holy sites and the Palestinian Authority for its failure to stamp out anti-Christian crime. It also reported that the former gives preferential treatment in basic civic services to Jews and the latter does so to Muslims. The report stated that, generally, ordinary Muslim and Christian citizens enjoy good relations in contrast to the "strained" Jewish and Arab relations.[15] A 2005 BBC report also described Muslim and Christian relations as generally "peaceful", while noting that some Christians complain of harassment and discrimination.[7] The Arab Human Rights Association, an Arab NGO in Israel, has stated that Israeli authorities have denied Palestinian Christians in Israel access to holy places, prevented repairs needed to preserve historic holy sites, and carried out physical attacks on religious leaders.[19] Kairos Palestine—an independent coalition Christian organisation, set up to help communicate to the Christian world what is happening in Palestine—sent a letter to The Wall Street Journal to explain that "In the case of Bethlehem, for instance, it is in fact the rampant construction of Israeli settlements, the chokehold imposed by the separation wall and the Israeli government's confiscation of Palestinian land that has driven many Christians to leave."[20]

Contrary to some claims, the emigration phenomenon is not primarily driven by Muslim-Christian relations.[21][22][23] The Jerusalem Post stated that Muslim pressure has not played a major role according to Christian residents themselves. Hanna Siniora, a prominent Christian Palestinian human rights activist, has attributed harassment against Christians to "little groups" of "hoodlums" rather than to the Hamas and Fatah governments.[8] In his last novel, the Palestinian Christian writer Emile Habibi has a character affirm that: "There is no difference between Christian and Muslim: we are all Palestinian in our predicament."[24]

Political and media claims

Blame games over the causes of Christian emigration from Palestine have become a recurring feature in media coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, in efforts to influence opinion of Christian communities in the West.[25]

In 2006, a draft bill was introduced by Representatives Michael McCaul and Joseph Crowley, drafted by their staffers Ari Stein and Gregg Sheiowitz,[26] which attributed the decline of the Christian population primarily to alleged failures by the Palestinian Authority.[27] According to Professor Daphne Tsimhoni of the Israel Institute of Technology “almost all the bill's assertions are either exaggerations, misrepresentations or sheer fabrications.”[26] Representatives of churches in Palestine submitted a letter to the U.S. House Committee on International Relations stating that the resolution misrepresented the causes of Christian emigration by emphasizing internal religious or political factors while omitting the impact of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, including movement restrictions and economic constraints. Critics noted that the resolution had been drafted without consultation with Palestinian Christian institutions and risked reinforcing politicized narratives about Christian–Muslim relations in the region. The resolution was quietly withdrawn following the criticism.[28]

In 2012, the CBS News program 60 Minutes aired a report titled “Christians of the Holy Land”, presented by correspondent Bob Simon, examining the decline of Christian communities in Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and surrounding areas.[29] The segment linked emigration to conditions associated with the broader Israeli–Palestinian conflict, including restrictions on movement and economic pressures. Michael Oren, then Israeli ambassador to the United States, attempted to influence CBS to withdraw it prior to publication, arguing that it placed disproportionate blame on Israel. Simon responded by defending the reporting both on air and in subsequent interviews, stating that the segment reflected the testimony of local Christian residents and clergy and was consistent with available historical and empirical research.[30]

History

Early emigration

Christian emigration from Palestine predates the Arab–Israeli conflict, beginning in the late Ottoman period and intensifying during the British Mandate, when drought, economic marginalization, and early transnational family networks facilitated large-scale movement to the Americas. Scholarly studies describe this emigration as structural rather than episodic, rooted in unequal access to land, capital, and political power rather than solely in sectarian relations.[31]

Thousands of Christian Palestinians "emigrated to Latin America in the 1920s, when Mandatory Palestine was hit by drought and a severe economic depression."[32] Today, Chile houses the largest Palestinian Christian community in the world outside of the Levant. As many as 350,000 Palestinians reside in Chile, most of whose families came from Christian villages such as Bethlehem and surrounding villages.[33] Also, El Salvador, Honduras, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other Latin American countries have significant Palestinian Christian communities, some of whom immigrated almost a century ago during the time of Ottoman Palestine.[34]

Nakba

Prior to the Nakba, 135,550 Christians lived in Mandatory Palestine, of which 110,200 (81%) lived in areas that are today Israel and East Jerusalem, and 25,350 (19%) in what is now the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[1] Palestinian Christians were disproportionately affected by displacement, with an estimated 35–40% becoming refugees, accelerating the demographic contraction of historic Christian centers such as Jaffa, West Jerusalem, and Galilee towns.[35] Subsequent Israeli policies restricting return, residency rights, family reunification, land use, and access to employment have been identified as long-term drivers of Christian out-migration from East Jerusalem and the West Bank.[36][35]

From 1948 to the early 1950s, Ben-Gurion's Transfer Committee authorized projects for the transference of the Christian communities of the Galilee to Argentina, but the proposal failed in the face of Christian opposition.[37][38]

Current period

In 2024, according to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, there were 180,300 Christians in Israel (including East Jerusalem), of which c.141,900 (79%) are Arab Christians (Palestinian Christians) living in the Northern District (68%, c.96,500), Haifa District (15%, c.21,300) and other areas (17%), with 44% in just three locations: Nazareth and Nof HaGalil (30,300 combined),[39] Haifa (18,700) and Jerusalem (13,100). The c.38,400 non-Arab Christians live mainly in the Tel Aviv District and Central District (41% combined), and in the Northern and Haifa Districts (35% combined).[2]

In 2017, the most recent census by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, there were 46,850 Christians in the Palestinian territories, the vast majority living in the West Bank, which accounted for 45,712 Christians (c.98%), while the Gaza Strip was home to just 1,138 Christians (c.2%). Christian communities in the West Bank were highly concentrated, with nearly three-quarters living in three governorates: the Bethlehem Governorate (23,165; 51%), the Ramallah & Al-Bireh Governorate (10,255; 22%), and the Jerusalem Governorate (8,558; 19%). Smaller Christian populations were present in the Jenin Governorate (2,699), the Nablus Governorate (601), the Jericho & Al-Aghwar Governorate (285), and other governorates, each accounting for less than 2% of the total. In the Gaza Strip, Christians were concentrated primarily in the Gaza Governorate (1,082; 95%), with very small communities in the North Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Deir Al-Balah Governorates.[3]

Most of the Gaza Strip's Christian population lived in Gaza City, in the northern part of the Gaza Strip.[40] As of October 2024, most of Gaza's Christians had decided to remain in the churches' compounds in northern Gaza.[41] In November 2024, Israel announced that no Palestinians would be allowed to "return" to North Gaza.[42][43][44]

Population tables

The tables below show the Christian population of Mandatory Palestine by location, compared to the modern day Christian population for the same location where available. The tables are separated into the two tables showing each location in modern Israel and East Jerusalem in which more than 250 Christians were living in 1945, and the remaining locations with less than 250 Christians each, and two equivalent tables for the Christian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Locations in 1945 Mandatory Palestine with >250 Christians – currently under Israeli jurisdiction (Israel and East Jerusalem), ordered by 1945 Christian population
1945 population Nakba population impact Current population
Christians[45] %[45] Modern jurisdiction Christians % Date
Jerusalem 29,350 19% Partly depopulated Israel and East Jerusalem 12,760[46] 1%[46] 2022
Haifa 26,570 19% Depopulated Israel 16,840[47] 6%[47] 2022
Jaffa 15,400 16% Depopulated
Nazareth 8,600 61% Addition of IDPs 20,910[48] 27%[48] 2022
Ramle 3,260 22% Depopulated 3,720[49] 5%[49] 2022
Acre 2,330 19% Depopulated 1,390[50] 3%[50] 2022
Lydda 1,840 11% Depopulated 770[51] 0.9%[51] 2022
El Bassa 1,590 54% Expelled and destroyed[52] 0 0 -
Shafa ‘Amr 1,560 43% Addition of IDPs 10,620[53] 24%[53] 2022
Er Rama 1,160 69% 3,880[54] 50%[54] 2022
I'billin 1,060 64% 5,790[55] 42%[55] 2022
Kafr Yasif 1,010 72% 5,450[56] 52%[56] 2022
Deir el Qasi and El Mansura 880 70% Depopulated 0 0 -
Maghar and El Mansura 800 37% Addition of IDPs, and depopulated 5,110[57] 21%[57] 2022
Mi'ilya 790 88% Addition of IDPs 3,270[58] 100%[58] 2022
Tiberias 760 7% Evacuated and refused reentry[59] n.a.[60] n.a.[60] 2022
Kafr Bir‘im 700 99% Expelled and destroyed[61][62] 0 0 -
Tarshiha 690 18% Addition of IDPs 2,430[63] 11%[63] 2022
Ein Karim 670 21% Depopulated 0 0 -
Kafr Kanna 610 32% Addition of IDPs 2,270[64] 9.4%[64] 2022
Eilabun 530 96% 4,090[65] 71%[65] 2022
Er Reina 500 39% 2,830[66] 15%[66] 2022
Yafa 490 46% 3,410[67] 17%[67] 2022
Iqrith 460 94% Expelled and destroyed[61][62] 0 0 -
Beisan 430 8% Depopulated n.a.[68] n.a.[68] -
Safad 430 4% Depopulated n.a.[69] n.a.[69] 2022
Et Tur 390 14% Addition of refugees East Jerusalem n.a. n.a.
Abu Sinan 380 46% Addition of IDPs[62] Israel 2,200[70] 15%[70] 2022
El Buqeia 370 37% 1,280[71] 21%[71] 2022
Jish 350 32% 2,030[72] 63%[72] 2022
Tur‘an 340 25% 1,610[73] 11%[73] 2022
Isfiya 300 17% 1,770[74] 14%[74] 2022
El Bi'na 300 36% 640[75] 7%[75] 2022
Sakhnin 290 11% 1,660[76] 5%[76] 2022
El Mujeidil 260 14% Depopulated 0 0 -
Subtotal 105,450 77.8% of the 135,550 Christian population (1945)
Locations in 1945 Mandatory Palestine with >250 Christians – currently under Palestinian jurisdiction (West Bank and Gaza Strip), ordered by 1945 Christian population
1945 population Nakba population impact Current population
Christians[45] %[45] Modern jurisdiction Christians % Date
Bethlehem 6,430 73% Addition of refugees[79][80] West Bank 7,140[81] 28%[81] 2008
Ramallah 4,440 87% 6,120[81] 22%[81] 2008
Beit Jala 3,510 95% 7,140[81] 61%[81] 2008
Beit Sahur 2,400 87% 8,160[81] 66%[81] 2008
Et Taiyiba 1,180 89% 1,300[81] 90%[81] 2008
Gaza 1,010 3% Gaza Strip 1,000[82] <1% 2025
Bir Zeit 990 63% West Bank 2,244[81] 50%[81] 2008
Ez Zabubida 780 90% 2,500[81] 68%[81] 2008
Nablus 680 3%
Jifna 580 64% 1,122[81] 65%[81] 2008
Abud 530 49% 1,224[81] 59%[81] 2008
Rafidiya 350 81%
El Bira 280 10%
Tulkarm 280 3%
Jericho 260 9%
Ein ‘Arik 250 41% 500[81] 32%[81] 2008
Subtotal 23,950 17.7% of the 135,550 Christian population (1945)

See also

Notes

References

  1. ^ a b The Mandatory Palestine census statistics shown in Village Statistics, 1945 (full details at File:Village Statistics 1945 full.pdf) gave a Christian population of 135,550. The tables below (#Population tables) show the villages organized by modern jurisdiction: of the 135,550, there were 110,200 (81%) in what is now modern Israel and East Jerusalem (split 105,450 and 4,750 between those communities with more than 250 and those with less than 250 Christians), and 25,350 (19%) in what is now the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements) and the Gaza Strip (split 23,950 and 1,400 between communities with more than 250 and those with less than 250 Christians).
  2. ^ a b "Christmas 2024 - Christians in Israel" (PDF). Retrieved 2026-01-18.
  3. ^ a b State of Palestine Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. "Preliminary Results of the Population, Housing and Establishments Census, 2017" (PDF). p. 35. Retrieved 2026-01-20.
  4. ^ Kårtveit 2014, p. 203a: "Since the late Ottoman period, a large number of Palestinians have left their home communities in response to warfare, political oppression and lack of economic opportunities. Due to historical circumstances, emigration has been especially high among Palestinian Christians."
  5. ^ Sabella 1998, p. 127, 128: "Christian Arabs emigrate virtually for the same general causes, irrespective of country. Specific causes highlight the course of emigration for individual countries."
  6. ^ "FACTBOX – Christians in Israel, West Bank and Gaza". Reuters. 10 May 2009. Archived from the original on 15 February 2021. Retrieved 11 January 2014.
  7. ^ a b c "Guide: Christians in the Middle East". BBC. 15 December 2005. Archived from the original on 15 January 2008. Retrieved 6 May 2007.
  8. ^ a b c Derfner, Larry (7 May 2009). "Persecuted Christians?". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 22 August 2023. Retrieved 10 May 2009.
  9. ^ Sabella 1998, p. 127.
  10. ^ Shikaki & Ladadweh 2020, p. 1.
  11. ^ Schmitt, Kenny (2020-11-09). "Gazan Christians: Pilgrimage Permits, Migration, and the Exchange of Precarity". Exchange: Journal of Contemporary Christianities in Context. 49 (3–4): 316–338. doi:10.1163/1572543X-12341572. ISSN 0166-2740. Retrieved 2025-12-29. The Gazan Christians in this study articulated several primary factors that influenced their motives for migration. The most significant motives involved the negative push factors drawing them away from the Strip and centered on the overwhelming precarity of their experience. This precarity was temporal and spatial in that Gazans were subject to a strict blockade; it was economic in that finding work and providing for families became exceptionally challenging; it was political because they could only envision a stalemate between contending political parties, and it was religious because they were concerned about deteriorating Muslim-Christian relations under Hamas' authority. Gazan Christians were also pulled to the West Bank by the precarity of personal factors. They desired stronger social connections with family and friends outside Gaza, and they needed to address the practical problem of finding marriage partners for young people among a dwindling population. The dominant constellation of Christian interviewees' motives for escaping Gaza included the blockade, the economic collapse, the destructions of wars, the lack of consistent electricity and clean drinking water, and the pervasive sense of despair. Every interviewee explained that these factors played a decisive role in the decision to escape.
  12. ^ Fawadleh 2015, p. 153.
  13. ^ Sharp, Heather (22 December 2005). "Bethlehem's Christians cling to hope". BBC News. Archived from the original on 19 May 2019. Retrieved 17 August 2009.
  14. ^ Kårtveit 2014, p. 203: "With each generation, family networks both at home and in the diaspora have been instrumental in determining what opportunities are available to individuals through emigration, and how people evaluate these opportunities as compared to those offered by staying at home. Through a long history of migration to the Americas, strong family networks and patrimonial forms of business management have offered safety nets and a starting base for new generations of Palestinian Christian emigrants, widening the range of opportunities and minimizing the sense of risk and uncertainty associated with emigration. Family networks abroad also affect people’s sense of attachment to their home communities, as the gradual emigration of entire family groups sometimes undermines their sense of commitment to, and sense of safety within their home community. For the above reasons, transnational family networks have been instrumental in encouraging further emigration, informing people’s decisions about where to emigrate, and leading emigrants in new directions, establishing new bases in the diaspora to be subsequently utilized by wider family networks."
  15. ^ a b "Israel and the Occupied Territories". 2001-2009.state.gov. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
  16. ^ "Demography Overview, 2024: Diverging Fertility, Shifting Migration, and Shrinking Yishuvim". מרכז טאוב. 2025-01-23. Retrieved 2026-01-25.
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  18. ^ "Americans not sure where Bethlehem is, survey shows". Ekklesia. 20 December 2006. Archived from the original on 3 December 2013. Retrieved 7 May 2007.
  19. ^ "Sanctity Denied: The Destruction and Abuse of and Christian Holy Places in Israel" (in Arabic). arabhra.org. Archived from the original on 23 February 2010. Retrieved 10 May 2009.
  20. ^ "Christian Palestinians: Israel 'Manipulating Facts' by Claiming We Are Welcome". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 20 August 2015. Retrieved 21 January 2016.
  21. ^ Sabella 1998, p. 151, 152: "The causes for Palestinian Christian emigration do not include the rise of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ as a factor. There is no direct effect of this phenomenon on effective Palestinian Christian emigration. Considering the history of good Muslim—Christian relations in Palestine and the fact that Christians are a small numerical segment of the population, not exceeding 3 per cent at the most, there is no reason for alarm over inter-religious relations… While in Egypt some Copts actually emigrate to escape the tense, intercommunal environment, there are no recorded cases in Palestine to indicate a similar trend."
  22. ^ Hazran 2019, p. Abstract: "Instead of the generalized and simplistic explanations that are often advanced that link the Christians’ emigration to Islamic revivals, the main dynamic of this out migration instead can be found in the policies of the modern Arab state and the outbreak of communal and regional conflicts."
  23. ^ Al Qass Collings, Kassis & Raheb 2008, p. 35: "According to Diyar's recent study entitled “The Presence of Christians in the West Bank and Their Attitudes Towards Church Related Organizations”, most of those who choose to emigrate amongst the Christians of Palestine are mainly aggravated by the lack of freedom and security. The second main concern and motivation for emigration is the deteriorating economic situation in Palestine. On the scale of main causes of emigration, the latter is followed by political instability in the region, then by pursue of education abroad. At the bottom of the scale are family reunification, fleeing religious extremism and finding a spouse. The survey also concluded that the demographic imbalance – less children and young adults – in the Christian population compared to that of the Muslim population in Palestine is attributed to emigration, as well as the desire to start a family in a relatively older age than the average age."
  24. ^ Habibi, Emile (2006). Saraya, the Ogre's Daughter: A Palestinian Fairy Tale. Ibis Editions. p. 169.
  25. ^ Kårtveit 2014, p. 209: “While local churches and community leaders struggle to keep Christians in Palestine and to keep their communities alive, there is also a struggle over how to interpret these events, and how to tell the story of Christians within the Palestinian community and to the outside world. The proposed congressional resolution mentioned at the start of this book and the local responses it provoked represent two different sides to their story. While the McCaul and Crowley resolution ignored the devastating effects of Israel’s occupation and explained Christian sufferings solely in terms of Muslim hostility and oppression, local organizations often paint a picture of national unity and harmonious relations across sectarian lines. This battle over narratives is fought again and again. The dispute over who is to blame for Christian emigration is part of an Israeli–Palestinian battle for international sympathy, one that also challenges Israel's traditional support among Christian communities in the West.”
  26. ^ a b Nir, Ori (2006-06-23). "Fight Erupts in D.C. Over Plight of Palestinian Christians". The Forward. Retrieved 2025-12-30.
  27. ^ Kårtveit 2014, p. 1-2: “The contents of this resolution were met with shock and disbelief within the Christian community of Bethlehem. It turned out that neither community leaders nor church representatives had been consulted on the situation of Christians in Palestine. As a response, Palestinian churches, Christian NGOs and the Municipality of Bethlehem issued their own statements, declaring that this resolution was marred by false accusations and that it created a distorted image of a Christian minority disconnected from their own national community. They pointed out that contrary to the McCaul and Crowley resolution, Palestinian Christians have good relations with their Muslim neighbors and that the real aggressor against local Christians is the State of Israel. In particular, the statements stressed that emigration among Palestinian Christians was fueled not by internal persecution, but by ongoing Israeli policies of collective punishments, the continued growth of settlements, the Separation Wall constructed on Palestinian land, and a policy of closures that has devastated the Bethlehem economy and ruined livelihoods.”
  28. ^ Kampeas, Ron (2006-10-30). "Palestinian laments Christian plight". Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Retrieved 2025-12-30. The response had an effect: By the end of summer, Crowley and McCaul quietly withdrew the resolution.
  29. ^ Kårtveit 2014, p. 209-210: “More recently, this was highlighted with the controversy over a report aired on the cbs news program 60 minutes in April 2012. In the months ahead, 60 minutes had prepared a report on the flight of local Christians from the West Bank. Fearing a story that would blame Israel for the hardships of Palestinian Christians, Michael Oren, Israel’s Ambassador to the US, contacted the head of CBS News in an attempt to kill the story. In a bold move, 60 minutes correspondent Bob Simon responded by confronting the Ambassador on air. The report itself contained interviews with several prominent Palestinian Christians, who all related their hardships to the Israeli occupation (Wright 2012). After it was aired, the program ignited protest from political pressure groups and individuals in the US, who accused CBS of inciting hatred against Israel. Not surprisingly, the report was well received in the West Bank, where the interviewees were praised for ‘setting the record straight’, and identifying Israeli policies as the primary source of their hardships.”
  30. ^ Wright, Robert (2012-04-23). "60 Minutes on the Plight of Palestinian Christians". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2025-12-30.
  31. ^ Sabella 1998, p. 130-134.
  32. ^ Matthew Kalman in Beit Jala (12 April 2011). "The ravaged palace that symbolises the hope of peace". The Independent. Archived from the original on 25 September 2017. Retrieved 21 January 2016.
  33. ^ "PALESTINIANS IN LATIN AMERICA // "You see how many we are!'". St. Petersburg Times. 2001-01-02. Retrieved 2026-01-07. Archived 17 September 2010 at the Wayback Machine
  34. ^ Palestine in South America. V!VA Travel Guides. vivatravelsguides.com Archived 18 March 2018 at the Wayback Machine
  35. ^ a b Sabella 1998, p. 134-135.
  36. ^ Kårtveit 2014, p. 171-172.
  37. ^ Elaine C. Hagopian, ' Palestinian Refugee: Victims of Zionist Ideology,' in Maurine and Robert Tobin (ds.), How Long O Lord?: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Voices from the Ground and Visions of the Future in Israel/Palestine, Cowley Publications 2003 pp. 36–37: "The Scheme called for preventing expelled Palestinians trom returning to their homes; destroying Arab villages; preventing cultivation of Palestinian lands; settling Jews in Palestinian towns and villages; passing legislation to bar the return of refugees; launching a campaign to discourage refugee return; and working to resettle refugees elsewhere. Hence, "transfer" efforts continued. Among some of the proposed projects were "transfer" of Christian Arabs of the upper Galilee [in Israel] in 1951 to South America [Argentina]; in 1955-56, a proposal to settle Palestinian refugees in Libya [then under a pro-West monarchy] with American assistance; and a stillborn plan in July 1956 to expel Israeli Palestinians from a northern area to Lebanon. Then "transfer" receded from 1957 to 1967 while Israel consolidated its power, economy and society.
  38. ^ Masalha, Nur (1996). "An Israeli Plan to Transfer Galilee's Christians to South America: Yosef Weitz and "Operation Yohanan," 1949–53". CMEIS Occasional Paper. Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham. ISSN 1357-7522.
  39. ^ Nof HaGalil, also known as “Upper Nazareth”, had an Arab Christian population of 10,500 in 2024. Nazareth itself had an Arab Christian popultion of 19,800.
  40. ^ Tulloch, Joseph. "Palestinian Christians despair as Gaza homeland destroyed by Israel's war". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
  41. ^ Sudilovsky, Judith. "In the 'bleeding region,' Gaza Strip's Christian community lifts each other up, defying reality". www.ncronline.org. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
  42. ^ Kubovich, Yaniv. "'There will be no return': IDF says it won't allow residents to return to northern Gaza". Haaretz.com. Archived from the original on 11 November 2024. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
  43. ^ McKernan, Bethan; Christou, William (6 November 2024). "Palestinians will not be allowed to return to homes in northern Gaza, says IDF". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
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  78. ^ Eviction of residents from Beit Jimal in Har’el: Palmach brigade in Jerusalem, Zvi Dror (ed. Nathan Shoḥam), Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers: Benei Barak 2005, p. 270 (Hebrew)
    Fleeing and destruction of Abil el Qamh in Khalidi, 1992, pp.428-429
  79. ^ Al Qass Collings, Kassis & Raheb 2008, p. 36: "On the other hand, Zababdeh had relatively gained in population. Although the town had lost a lot of its residents to emigration, it is still considered a good alternative for internal migration, for some. Zababdeh holds a relatively high percentage of Christians; one drive for some Christians aiming for resettlement. "
  80. ^ Al Qass Collings, Kassis & Raheb 2008, p. 36: "Ain Arik, in comparison, could be one of the very few villages that have not been recently massively affected by emigration. Less than 500 people immigrated from Ain Arik to some European countries over the past 40 years. However, the village has a relatively small population to start with, especially if taken into consideration that a third of its population consists of refugees from surrounding villages and towns, and their offspring, who settled in Ain Arik Refugee Camp after the Nakba of 1948."
  81. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah Al Qass Collings, Kassis & Raheb 2008, p. 7-8.
  82. ^ "Israel strikes Gaza church, killing 3 and wounding priest who was close to late pope". NPR. 2025-07-17. Retrieved 2025-07-28.
  83. ^ Al Qass Collings, Kassis & Raheb 2008, p. 35: "On one hand, Qubebeh, in the Jerusalem Governorate, is one of the many villages that were extremely affected by the Nakba of 1948. Its population was estimated to be (799) in 1931 and (1730) in 1945 – all of whom were Christian – added to (877) nomadic Bedouins in 1945. About 2,000 people were evicted from the town when the Jewish Haganah militias destroyed most of the village's residential area. The refugees and the internally displaced, originally from Qubebeh, mounted to 12,253 Palestinians in 2007. According to the PCBS estimates, about 2,000 Palestinians lived in the village in 2006. Until recently, three Christian families resided in the village. However, only 11 members of one of those families live in the village now, while the other 9 members of that same family spend most of their time in Jerusalem city. The two other families immigrated to the USA and a few members migrated to Jerusalem city. "

Bibliography

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